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RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHDC  
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RUCPDO/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC  
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//DCO-I//  
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC  
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0082  
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0686

UNCLAS BAKU 000811

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/ECC - JFRIEDMAN, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN  
DEPT FOR EUR/ACE - KBILGE  
CBP/INA FOR CSTALLWORTH, RWATT, KCHAISSON, CDONOFRIO  
USDOE/NNSA FOR TPERRY, RTALLEY  
DOC FOR PETERSEN-BEARD  
COAST GUARD FOR SHABTEMICHAEL

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [ETTC](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KSTC](#) [KNNP](#) [AJ](#)

SUBJECT: EXBS: AZERBAIJAN ADVISOR MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE -  
September 2009

I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS:

A. An International Border Interdiction Course scheduled for the week of 21 September was cancelled due to the lack of MFA response to a diplomatic note requesting approval and names of students.

B. Commander Ross Stroebel from the U.S. Coast Guard is in Azerbaijan for an intensive two week cooperative study of the Azerbaijani Coast Guard's (AJCG) maintenance, sustainability, and logistics capabilities. A final report will be made available to the AJCG, DTRO, and EXBS.

C. Given that the State Border Service (SBS) is not currently participating in EXBS funded training no equipment purchases will be made for the SBS until which time they resume participation in EXBS training courses.

D. The AJCG Commander expressed support for sending two junior AJCG officers to long term resident training in the U.S. The EXBS Advisor is in the process of notifying the Government of Azerbaijan (GOAJ) through official channels with the goal of a training start date in mid 2010.

E. GOAJ authorities reported the seizure of radioactive material at a port of entry on the Russian border. The material seized was radium 226 in luminescent paint on Soviet-era aircraft dials. Further details in Paragraph E.

II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD

A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS DURING REPORTING PERIOD:

The Advisor continues to work with Mr. Fuad Maharramov of the Baku Center for Foreign Trade Security regarding the proposal for EXBS to fund a government to industry outreach website containing information regarding export control in Azerbaijan.

2 September - The EXBS Advisor met with Deputy Commander of the State Border Service Major-General Farhad Taghizada at his request to discuss the future of EXBS/SBS cooperation. The EXBS Advisor informed the General that if the SBS does not participate in EXBS funded training, no further equipment provisions will be made. The General expressed dismay that cooperation between SBS and U.S. Customs and Border Protection would be adversely affected and

further stressed that SBS cooperation with the U.S. government should not be adversely effected by political issues between the USG and the GOAJ. The EXBS Advisor agreed to pass his concerns to the Bureau but that as the situation currently stands, EXBS funded equipment provisions for the SBS are on hold.

15 September - The EXBS Advisor met with members of the WMD-PPI team to discuss cooperative EXBS/DTRO efforts with the AJCG. The WMD-PPI team members were Project Manager Kevin Sullivan and Project Officer Steven Frake. The team discussed the details for the upcoming visit by a U.S. Coast Guard officer for a maintenance and sustainability assessment of the AJCG and to discuss the status of a pending EXBS funded equipment purchase for the AJCG.

18 September - The EXBS Advisor submitted final comments on a draft report on strategic trade controls in Azerbaijan by the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security. This draft report is an update to a previous similar report from 2005. The new report illustrates that although Azerbaijan has made some very minor improvements in export controls since 2005 much improvement is still needed.

24 September - The EXBS Advisor briefed a State Department Anti-Terrorist Assessment Team that was TDY to Baku. The briefing covered all relevant information on border security issues in Azerbaijan.

29 September - The EXBS Advisor met with Mr. Fuad Maharramov of the Baku Center for Foreign Trade Security to discuss options for payment of a contract to establish and maintain a website dedicated to government to industry outreach in the area of licensing and export control.

B. TRAINING CONDUCTED DURING REPORTING PERIOD:

NONE

C. ITEMS DELIVERED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD:

Description	US \$ Value
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D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT STATUS UPDATE:

TRAINING:

NONE

EQUIPMENT - Procurement in process:

Description	US \$ Value
Hand-held Trace Detectors/Analyzers	Out for bid
Baggage X-ray System	
Radioisotope Identifiers	
X-ray Florescence Metal Analyzers	
Portal Type Metal Detectors	
Density Meter Kits	
Fiberscope Kits	

E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT CONTROLS, NONPROLIFERATION, OR RELATED BORDER SECURITY:

The 16 September seizure of innocent radioactive material at the Russian border crossing of Xanoba illustrated that the State Border Service (SBS) is at least at times utilizing the radiation portal monitors provided through the Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense Program. However, the response procedure that took place during the incident illustrated a weak link in that the GOAJ agency responsible for responding to such seizures, the Institute for Radiation Problems (IRP), called the U.S. Embassy for financial support to mobilize a response to the incident. Additionally, SBS officers have been trained extensively to identify and determine the difference between innocent or otherwise naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and isotopes of concern yet SBS leadership notified the IRP that they had seized "very dangerous radioactive material." The material turned out to be a minute amount of radium paint on Soviet era aircraft instrument panel dials. The

IRP identified the material as radium 226 which is a commonly occurring commercial source of radiation. As this is not an isotope of concern the IRP team left the seized items with the SBS officers at Xanoba. Had the SBS officers properly used the SLD provided handheld equipment for a secondary inspection they could have identified the suspect material themselves thereby avoiding the need for IRP to respond. The SBS has since not been forthcoming with any details regarding further action on the incident but the IRP has stated that they are no longer involved. The overall response to the incident illustrates an immediate need for the GOAJ to evaluate and improve legislation related to radioactive material and further develop national response capabilities, plans, and procedures.

POC for this report is David Hall, EXBS Advisor.

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